The Norvegian operators have agreed on how to deal with the issue of Network Neutrality and enumerated these three principles
I think they are good, but I think they fail to fully capture some other important aspects, which I try to explain below.
- send and receive content of their choice
- use services and run applications of their choice
- connect hardware and use software of their choice that do not harm the network.
Why there's an issue with Net Neutrality ?
We are discussing about Net Neutrality because all traffic is collapsing on one IP network and latency sensitive traffic needs to be protected by excessive resource usage; while latency sensitive traffic and IP best effort traffic traveled on separated networks, there was little issue (except clear anticompetitive behaviours) for traffic management. In those times the discrimination was total: "premium traffic" on one wire, best effort on the other.
I have seen many variations in the possible definition of Network Neutrality; there are many angles the issue can be looked at and, when you get into details, "net neutrality" tends to mean different things to different people.
Three classes of motivations for traffic management
IMHO, the three main possible reasons I see for traffic inspection and/or management over a network are
B) to manage traffic in order to optimize throughput of specific applications
C) to manage traffic in order to favour applications provided by specific entities
Is content filtering useful ?
A) can include bans on
specific contents issued by some authority, something that, if not
supported by adequate guarantees in the legal system, could lead to
censorhsip.
I am not going to argue about civil and political rights, which, IMHO,
are the most important reason why any citize should oppose content
inspection; I'll try to focus on technology alone.
Inspections have always been carried to be at bottlenecks between state
borders. If there's nothing to inspect because nothing is inspectable,
the border does not exist anymore.
It is common to hear politicians asking if this technology can inspect
traffic and technology providers argue that it does. First of all it's
present kind of traffic and secondly it's the wrong question.
They should not ask if it works (indeed you can evaporate wter, it
works!) but if it can be a mean for enforcement (you cannot solve
tsunamis by evaporating water). The right question is "how difficult is
to circumvent these filtering ?" and the answer is obviously, not at
all.
We must understand that the growing power of electronic devices puts
strong criptography into the hands of consumers and these technologies
are unstoppable, thanks to electronics and furthermore are needed in
order to ensure authentication of users, corporate VPN traffic, digital
signatures, etc.
The side effect of these idea of content filtering is therefore that, if such practices were widespread, it
would become an incentive for applications developers to build
applications that put the power of strong criptography in the hands of
the average Joe to "defend" themeselves, something that would cause the
hiding of the traffic. An effect clearly against the interests of those who propose content filtering.
Network optimization and the users' point of view
B) can include prioritization of time-sensitive applications (such as internet telephony, videoconferencing, application sharing) or degradation of traffic which might be considered "harmful" for the network carrying it, such as peer to peer traffic. The level of management needed depends on the available capacity of the network as users compete for a limited, rival resource. If network capacity was larger than the sum of the capacity of the local loops connecting the users (e.g, if the capacity was not a rival resource), the management of traffic would be limited to the end user's local loop in order to ensure the grateful flowing of time-sensitive applications' data. As backhauling and core networks will increasingly rely on optical fibres and optoelecronics prices decline, the backbone will tend to be a nonrival resource and this kind of traffic management need will decline. Actually, the backbone capacity needs to be far less than the sum of the capaicites of the local loops, as there is a limit to the amount of traffic an endpoint can consume; this seems to be the case considering the slowdown of traffic growth in certain economies where fibre networks are widespread.
(B1) Operators tend to think of network management as a way to save them costs, rather than as a service to the users. In this way, they look at traffic management as something they decide and enact that customers have no option but getting it. Another possible way would be to offer traffic management, on user's request, with a differentiated pricing. Personally, I am paying a premium to use an ISP which prioritizes VoIP traffic so that my voice calls don't get crippy. Following this schema, I think there is a latent need by many users to demote their low priority file transfer traffic, promote the web traffic and have a premium VoIP traffic. Why not trying selling quality of service as an additional feature users might request rather than imposing it to all users ?
Traffic management and its anticompetitive risks
C) this behaviour can be enacted to benefit the same operator's applications or some operator's "friend"'s applications. In the first case there's a point for an antitrust case (as the operator owns an essential facility for those users connected to his network), and even the second cannot be as evident. This kind of management does not require to be specifically technical; it could be based on pricing with a price structure designed to discourage specific kind of traffic. For example, a pricing that would include a high session-setup fee as we find in wireless data plans, discourages the use of sporadic, short data sessions, such as the traffic required by messaging, thus protecting the operator's SMS business. (*)
(C1) I have been personally (successfully) envolved in a case whereby an incumbent operator argued that a new IPTV service he provided to his retail customers was a "new service" encompassing a vertical integration between data transport and the TV content. The operator argued that it should have not been looked at this service from an antitrust perspective related to the data transport, but rather looking a the the TV market, where the operator had a marginal presence. The point I brought to the court was that, if a competitor wanted to build a similar service (with on demand content), he would have needed to buy from the incumbent the data transport with similar characteristics and thus even that layer should have been exeamined and be replicable to other possible competitors. This case clearly shows that when "new services" come into the regulatory arena whereby an operator argues there should be a vertical integration, it is not that obvious that a court would rule in favour of an "horizontal unbundling" of the service.
(C2)
One other case I have been envolved with was an incumbent operator who
intended to benefit from network effects providing his customers a
higher quality service (videotelephony) refusing to interoperate with
other operators at the peering points (and even not releasing the codec
and signalling protocols) in order to attract more customers. When
formally requested for interoperability with the same quality of
service at the peering points and full details of the signalling, the
operator preferred to withdraw the service from the market. (this leads
me to think that the service was a loss making service designed just to
increase the customer base by exploiting network effects). Referring to
the Norwegian principle 2 above, it's not enough to receive and send
content and use applications of their choice; it needs to happen on a
level playing field. In the happy times when networks were separated,
voice came in nice and handy G711 quanta, which was handled on one
wire, while the fully liquid best effort traffic was handled on another
wire. The "interoperability" concept was an easy one: either fully
guaranteed or no guarantee. Interoperability is an on/off condition.
The merge of the voice traffic on IP networks prompted for some network
management, but it still is voice in handy well standardized quanta and
the good old on/off interoperability concept applies. What happens when
a new set of services appear which are neither latency-guaranteed voice
nor best effort ? there's not just 2 forms of traffic, there might be
many more, and interoperability is not just on/off but there might be
many colors of it.
Interoperating is not enough. You need to interoperate with a
comparable Quality of Service; otherwise there will be users with a
better users experience which would, in turn, lead to network effects.
Interoperability, without comparable QoS interoperability, paves the ground for anticompetitive behaviours.
(*) Be it noted that, while there's a bitstream wholesale offer, any ISP can compete anywhere in a country, purchasing wholesale at cost oriented (and hence flat) conditions, so any operator can provide a flat rate retail offer, so there will be one who does. As bitstream wholesale offers are not part of the regulation in the wireless market, so it is an excludable reource; furthermore spectrum is limited (rival) so traffic discrimination based on pricing in wireless is likely to stay with us for a long time, unless there's a very competitive wireless market.
Quinta's Network Neutrality principles
Based on the above, one could think that, rather than trying to give a technical definition of Network Neutrality, it could be possible to enumerate a set of principles which avoid the aforementioned problems, to the benefit of the customer.
So, this is my proposal for five principles:
- users have the right to know what they are offered by their ISPs
- users have the right to purchase, based on their free choice, an access which encompasses some network management; users have the right to purchase a best effort access, with non discriminatory pricing, with similar characteristics (**) (ref. B1)
- to ensure privacy of communications, traffic should not be discriminated on content (ref. A)
- traffic should not be discriminated by technology or pricing, based on who the endpoints of the communication are (ref. C1)
- operators offering a determined quality of service on their network should provide the same quality of service at the peering points to other operators who request it, at reasonable, non discriminatory, transparent conditions. (ref. C2)
(**) e.g. best effort should not cost more than managed and if there's a 20Mbps managed, there should be a 20Mbps best effort
I'd welcome your comments...





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